Data-Driven Envelopment with Privacy-Policy Tying
研究主导企业如何通过进入相邻数据密集型市场并实施掠夺性定价和隐私政策捆绑来保护其垄断地位，分析其对消费者的损害及数据解绑等补救措施。
Abstract We present a theory of monopoly protection by means of entry in adjacent markets that have a common customer base (i.e., envelopment). A firm dominant in its market enters a data-rich secondary market and engages in predatory pricing and privacy-policy tying. We define the latter as conditioning service provision to the subscription of a privacy policy that allows bundling of user data across all sources. Acquiring data from the secondary market confers an advantage in the data-intensive primary market that shields the dominant firm from entry, thus harming consumers. We discuss potential remedies, including data unbundling and portability.