Bargaining as a Struggle Between Competing Attempts at Commitment
构建了一个以战略承诺为核心的讨价还价模型，承诺能力源于让步成本并由玩家需求内生决定，在高让步成本极限下为Kalai讨价还价解提供了战略基础，并揭示了延迟均衡中的渐进主义特征。
Abstract The strategic importance of commitment in bargaining is widely acknowledged. Yet disentangling its role from key features of canonical models, such as proposal power and reputational concerns, is difficult. This paper introduces a model of bargaining with strategic commitment at its core. Following Schelling (1956, The American Economic Review, vol. 46, 281–306), commitment ability stems from the costly nature of concession and is endogenously determined by players’ demands. Agreement is immediate for familiar bargainers, modelled via renegotiation-proofness. The unique prediction at the high concession cost limit provides a strategic foundation for the Kalai bargaining solution. Equilibria with delay feature a form of gradualism in demands.