Pushing towards shared mobility
从理论上论证了市政停车部门对共享车辆给予优惠待遇的理由，分析了不同均衡下的社会福利，发现共享均衡能带来更高福利，而停车折扣可降低实现该均衡所需的投资。
This paper provides a theoretical argument for preferential treatment of shared vehicles (SV) over private ones by municipal parking authorities. When all parked vehicles are treated equally, multiple equilibria may exist: (i) a “private” one, in which travellers are hesitant to switch to SV because the latter are hard to find, and (ii) a “shared” equilibrium, in which travellers use shared mobility because the city is saturated with vacant SV. The latter equilibrium, if it exists, is shown to yield higher welfare. Municipal parking discounts for SV reduce the amount of investment required for a “big push” towards the shared equilibrium, or even make it the only equilibrium.