Multiple large shareholders and cost stickiness: evidence from China
研究中国上市公司多个大股东对成本粘性的影响，发现多个大股东会加剧成本粘性，原因是大股东间的协调成本削弱了对管理层的监督，而加强中小股东保护能消除这一效应。
Using a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2001 to 2017, this study investigates the impact of multiple large shareholders (MLS) on cost stickiness from the agency costs perspective. We find a positive association between MLS and cost stickiness after controlling for various determinants of cost stickiness. The results of additional analyses suggest that coordination costs among large shareholders make it challenging to monitor managers, and stronger protection of minority shareholders helps to eliminate the effect of MLS on cost stickiness. This paper extends our understanding of the ‘dark side’ of MLS and complements existing research investigating the determinants of cost stickiness from the ownership structure perspective.