On multimarket collusion and trade policies
研究当国际双寡头在分隔市场销售差异化产品时，政府战略贸易政策对贸易和福利的影响，发现合谋反而比竞争带来更多贸易和更高福利。
We analyze the impact of strategic government policies on trade and welfare when an international duopoly sells differentiated products in geographically-separated markets, and cross-hauling incurs a transportation cost. We compare competition between firms to multimarket collusion. In contrast to no-policy settings, where trade volumes are lower under collusion than under competition, with strategic trade policies, the volume of trade is lower under competition. Collusion increases trade, resulting in higher welfare relative to competition. • An international duopoly sells differentiated goods in geographically-separated markets • We compare competition between firms to multimarket collusion • With strategic trade policies, trade volumes are lower under competition than collusion • Collusion increases trade, resulting in higher welfare relative to competition