Shared Auditors in Private Lending
研究发现，借款人与银团贷款人共享同一审计师能减少借贷双方及银团内部的信息不对称，从而改善借款人获得贷款的条件，包括更优惠的价格和非价格条款，并促进银团多元化。
We examine whether borrowers who share the same auditor with a syndicate lender (i.e., shared auditors) have improved access to the syndicate loan market. We predict and find evidence that shared auditors reduce information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers as well as between lenders in a syndicate. We also find that borrowers who share auditors with lenders obtain better price and non-price terms compared with those without. Our empirical evidence also suggests that when borrowers and lenders share auditors, syndicates are less concentrated and more diverse, consistent with the prediction that shared auditors provide informational benefits on the syndicate market. Loan facilities with shared auditors are also more likely to be renegotiated with more favorable terms for borrowers. Taken together, our findings suggest that shared auditors contribute to the efficient functioning of debt markets by reducing the information asymmetries in debt contracting. JEL Classifications : M42, M41, G32, O16