Efficiency with endogenous population growth. Do children have too many rights?
用代际交叠模型分析内生生育率下的均衡效率，发现许多存在代际转移约束的均衡是P有效的，无需改变儿童权利来提高效率。
Fertility rates are declining in many countries. But are fertility rates inefficiently low? This paper addresses this question by exploring the efficiency properties of equilibria in an overlapping generations setting with endogenous fertility and dynastic parental altruism, using the notion of <math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" display="inline"> <mi mathvariant="script">P</mi> </math>‐efficiency proposed by Golosov, Jones and Tertilt (2007). In contrast to Schoonbroodt and Tertilt (2014), who show that any equilibrium for which nonnegativity constraints on intergenerational transfers are binding is <math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" display="inline"> <mi mathvariant="script">A</mi> </math>‐inefficient (and, under the assumption that new lives always increase social welfare, also <math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" display="inline"> <mi mathvariant="script">P</mi> </math>‐inefficient), I characterize symmetric, <math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" display="inline"> <mi mathvariant="script">P</mi> </math>‐efficient allocations as the equilibria arising from different distribution of rights among the agents, and show that many equilibria exhibiting binding constraints on transfers are <math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" display="inline"> <mi mathvariant="script">P</mi> </math>‐efficient. To be more precise, except for dynamically inefficient equilibria, there is no need to alter children's rights so as to achieve efficiency.