Clawback adoptions, managerial compensation incentives, capital investment mix and efficiency
研究发现追回条款的采用通过抑制应计盈余管理，促使管理者将资本投资从研发转向资本支出以维持基于薪酬的激励，从而降低资本投资效率，且对财务错报风险高的公司影响更显著。
We present evidence that clawback adoptions, by dissuading accruals management, motivate managers to shift capital investment mix from R&D to capex to preserve earnings-based compensation, thereby lowering capital investment efficiency. These effects are more pronounced for firms prone to financial misreporting, which is consistent with board incentives to adopt clawbacks, and with managerial incentives to substitute real for accruals-based earnings management to preserve performance-based compensation. Path analyses lend support to performance-based compensation serving as a channel through which clawback adoptions influence capital investment mix and efficiency. These findings extend and reinterpret prior findings and are timely given the Security and Exchange Commission's newly issued Rule 10D-1 that makes clawback provision adoptions a condition for U.S. exchange listings and explicitly requested “comment on any effect the proposed requirements may have on efficiency, competition, and capital formation.”