Organized Crime and Firms: Evidence from Antimafia Enforcement Actions
利用意大利1995-2015年各市镇反黑手党执法行动的时间差异，研究发现执法后企业间竞争和公共采购竞争加剧，未退出企业规模缩小，表明有组织犯罪构成市场进入壁垒并影响地方经济。
We exploit staggered municipality-level antimafia enforcement actions in Italy over the 1995–2015 period to study how the presence of organized crime affects firms. Following enforcement actions, we find increases in competition (i) among firms and (ii) for public procurement contracts. Firms that do not exit after a weakening of organized crime shrink in size, more so when operating in the nontradable sector. Our findings are consistent with organized crime acting as a barrier to entry and affecting local economic activity. This paper was accepted by David Sraer, finance. Supplemental Material: Data and the online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.00859 .