Fines, nonpayment, and revenues: evidence from speeding tickets
利用超速罚款金额在速度阈值处的跳跃和改革带来的变化，估计罚款对支付合规和收入的影响，发现罚款增加10%仅使及时支付率下降1.2个百分点，收入弹性约为0.9。
Abstract We estimate the effect of the level of fines on payment compliance and revenues collected from speeding tickets. Exploiting discontinuous increases in fines at speed cutoffs and reform-induced variation in these discontinuities, we implement two complementary regression discontinuity designs. The results consistently document small payment responses: a 10% increase in the fine (i.e., the payment obligation) induces a 1.2 percentage point decline in timely payments. The implied revenue elasticity is about 0.9. Expressed in absolute terms, a one-dollar increase in the fine translates into a roughly 60-cent increase in payments collected within 15 days.