Obfuscation and Rational Inattention*
研究双头垄断企业如何在价格竞争前进行价格混淆，以及理性疏忽消费者如何更新信息，发现混淆可能导致高价格均衡，透明则导致低价格均衡，为市场规制提供依据。
We study the behavior of duopolistic firms that can obfuscate their prices before competing on price. Obfuscation affects the rational inattentive consumers' optimal information strategy, which determines the probabilistic demand. Our model advances related models by allowing consumers to update their unrestricted prior beliefs with an informative signal of any form. We show that the game may result in an obfuscation equilibrium with high prices or a transparency equilibrium with low prices and no obfuscation, providing an argument for market regulation. Obfuscation equilibria cease to exist for low information costs and if one firm seems a priori considerably more attractive.