Global contagion risk and IMF credit cycles: Emergency exits and revolving doors
研究了国际货币基金组织（IMF）为何在成员国金融危机未解决时退出贷款，又常很快恢复贷款，发现全球传染风险是关键因素，通过阿根廷和希腊案例验证。
Abstract Why does the International Monetary Fund (IMF) exit its lending relationships before member states have resolved their financial crises? It is particularly surprising given that the IMF often resumes its lending shortly after its withdrawal. We argue that IMF withdrawals are conditioned by global contagion risk. The tension between the IMF's mandate of global financial stability and its limited financial resources compels the IMF's early exit from its lending relationships. During periods of high global contagion, the IMF prioritizes its mandate by continuing its lending despite noncompliance. However, when the IMF perceives minimal contagion risk, it focuses on moral hazard, and willingly cuts its lending ties to preserve its reputation and resources for future crises. Employing a comparative analysis of IMF decision‐making in two of its largest borrowers, Argentina and Greece, we find supportive evidence for our claims.