Optimal Exit Policy with Uncertain Demand*
研究了新进入者在不确定需求下进行沉没投资决策时，创新与退出价值呈倒U型关系，消费者剩余在最低退出价值处最大化，并应用于最优并购政策分析。
In a framework where entrants must make sunk investment decisions with uncertain returns and have private demand information, we show that the relationship between innovation and exit value is non‐monotone and features an inverted U‐shaped pattern. Consumer surplus is maximised at the lowest exit value that incentivises the investment. These insights are applied to optimal merger policy. An entrant is more willing to innovate to be acquired afterwards, even if it has no bargaining power. This innovation‐for‐buyout effect implies that an entrant is less likely to leave the market under a lenient than a strict merger policy.