Technology options and optimal pricing of a two-sided mobile payment platform
研究了连接商家和顾客的移动支付平台的最优定价策略，发现平台应补贴顾客注册、向商家收取交易费，且技术选择影响定价，补贴和收费水平取决于交易成本和银行手续费。
This study investigates the pricing strategies of a mobile payment platform connecting merchants and customers who may bypass the platform and trade in cash. Our analytical model incorporates cross-side network externalities at both sides of the platform. We find that the optimal pricing strategy involves cross-subsidization, including subsidizing customers to register for the service while charging the merchants per transaction. Moreover, the technology option adopted by the platform influences this optimal pricing format. In particular, the platform should subsidize customers more if the payment technology imposes larger transaction costs on customers and charge merchants more if banks demand a higher payment processing fee. Our major findings remain qualitatively valid when per-transaction subsidy is available and the marginal benefit of cross-side network externalities diminishes. Finally, the presence of a platform improves social welfare if the per-transaction subsidy sufficiently stimulates consumption on the platform.