Learning in Financial Markets: Implications for Debt-Equity Conflicts
研究了企业管理者从金融市场价格中学习信息以提升股权价值，但这一过程对债务风险高的企业可能降低社会效率，且学习效果不对称，影响风险转移和债务积压等代理问题。
Abstract Financial markets reveal information that firm managers can utilize when making equity value-enhancing investment decisions. However, for firms with risky debt, such investments are not necessarily socially efficient. Despite this friction, we show that learning from prices improves investment efficiency. This effect is asymmetric, however, as investors learn less about projects that decrease the riskiness of cash flows: efficiency is lower for diversifying investments than for focusing (risk-increasing) investments. This also implies that investors’ endogenous learning further attenuates risk shifting but amplifies debt overhang. Our model provides a novel channel through which learning from financial markets affects agency frictions between stakeholders.