Resale Price Maintenance in a Successive Monopoly Model*
研究了制造商在连续垄断下为何设定最低转售价格，取决于零售商不可合约化的变量（如替代品价格或服务努力），并区分了其竞争软化与服务保障两种效应，以判断对消费者的利弊。
We explain why a manufacturer may impose a minimum resale price in a successive monopoly setting. Our argument relies on the retailer having noncontractible choice variables such as the price of a substitute good and/or the retailer's service effort. Our explanation for minimum resale prices is empirically distinguishable from alternative justifications that rely, for instance, on retailer competition and service free riding among retailers. Whether a min RPM benefits or harms consumers depends on its effects: if it softens competition with the substitute product, it tends to harm consumers, and if it secures service provision, it tends to benefit consumers.