Secret Bilateral Forward Contracting*
研究了古诺寡头垄断中秘密双边远期合约如何影响企业产量和消费者福利，发现现货市场集中度低于可调度设施所有权集中度，且不可调度设施所有权分布与消费者福利无关，对电力市场政策有启示。
I analyze secret bilateral forward contracting in a Cournot oligopoly. A secret bilateral forward contract affects the production quantities of the firms which are party to the contract but not of the outsiders. On the one hand, forward contracts facilitate for heterogeneous firms to rationalize production across facilities. On the other hand, firms also consider how forward contracting affects their combined production. I show that the spot market is less concentrated than the ownership of dispatchable facilities in the industry. Furthermore, the ownership distribution of nondispatchable facilities is irrelevant for consumer welfare. I discuss implications for policy in electricity markets.