Risk Aversion and Double Marginalization*
研究了在需求不确定的垂直市场中，下游企业的风险规避如何导致无法通过两部收费消除双重边际化，并发现需求风险或风险规避的增强反而可能缓解双重边际化。
In vertical markets, eliminating double marginalization with a two‐part tariff may not be possible due to risk aversion. Under uncertain demand, contracts with large fixed fees expose the downstream firm to more risk than contracts that are more reliant on variable fees. In equilibrium, contracts may thus rely on variable fees, giving rise to double marginalization. Counterintuitively, however, we show that increased demand risk or risk aversion can actually mitigate double marginalization. We also characterize several sufficient conditions under which increased risk or risk aversion is guaranteed to exacerbate double marginalization. We conclude by discussing potential applications and extensions.