Pay, Stay, or Delay? How to Settle a Run
研究了不同结算规则如何平衡流动性提供与挤兑激励，发现最优暂停可能要求出售部分非流动资产，与货币市场基金惯例相反。
Abstract The classic view assumes banks prioritize immediate repayment by selling assets until default. We endogenize run frequency and study how general settlement rules trade off liquidity provision net of fire sale losses against induced run incentives. Panic runs are eliminated when all illiquid assets are sold under orderly resolution, but liquidity provision in a run is minimal. When suspension after some fire sales is followed by immediate liquidation, run frequency falls then rises in suspension delay. Thus, optimal suspension may require some sale of illiquid assets, in contrast to MMF norms. Ex post discretion induces excessive liquidation and more frequent runs.