Dynamic Persuasion and Strategic Search
研究企业如何动态设计信息结构来说服消费者，消费者则权衡搜索成本与收益决定是否搜索更多信息，发现企业仅在消费者对产品匹配度乐观时才会跨期平滑信息提供。
Consumers frequently search for information before making decisions. Because their search and purchase decisions depend on the information environment, firms have a strong incentive to influence it. This paper endogenizes the consumer’s information environment from the firm’s perspective and endogenizes the search decision from the consumer’s perspective. We consider a dynamic model where a firm sequentially persuades a consumer to purchase the product. The consumer only wishes to buy the product if it is a good match. The firm designs the information structure. Given the endogenous information environment, the consumer trades off the benefit and cost of information acquisition and decides whether to search for more information. Given the information acquisition strategy of the consumer, the firm trades off the benefit and cost of information provision and determines how much information to provide. This paper characterizes the optimal information structure under a general signal space. We find that the firm only smooths information provision over multiple periods if the consumer is optimistic about the product fit before searching for information. Moreover, if the search cost for the consumer is high, the firm designs the information such that the consumer will be certain that the product is a good match and will purchase it after observing a positive signal. If the search cost is low, the firm provides noisy information such that the consumer will be uncertain about the product fit but will still buy it after observing a positive signal. This paper was accepted by Dmitri Kuksov, marketing. Funding: This work was supported by University of California, Berkeley, the Institute for Business Innovation [Research Grant], and the Center for Equity, Gender, and Leadership [Research Grants]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.00994 .