基于信用退款政策的消费者内部价格歧视

Intraconsumer Price Discrimination with Credit Refund Policies

Management Science · 2023
被引 4
人大 A+FT50UTD24ABS 4*

中文导读

研究了卖家如何设计信用退款政策(而非现金退款),利用消费者估值随时间波动和退货概率,通过设置信用有效期实现同一消费者在不同时间点的价格歧视,并可能比现金退款更有利可图。

Abstract

Consumers often receive a full or partial refund for product returns or service cancellations. Much of the existing literature studies cash refunds, where consumers get the money back minus a fee upon a product return or service cancellation. However, not all refunds are issued in cash. Sometimes consumers receive credit that can be used for future purchases, oftentimes with an expiration term after which the credit is forfeited. We study the optimal design of credit refund policies. Different from models that consider cash refunds, we explicitly model repeated interactions between the seller and consumers over time. We assume that consumers’ valuation for the product/service varies over time and that there is an exogenous probability for product returns. Several interesting results emerge. First, a credit refund policy facilitates intraconsumer price discrimination for a single type of consumers with stochastic valuation. Second, an optimal policy often involves an intermediate credit expiration term, under which a consumer with a high product valuation always makes a purchase, whereas a consumer with a low product valuation may be induced to make a purchase as the credit approaches expiration, leading to a demand induction effect. Finally, a credit refund policy can be more profitable than a cash refund policy and can lead to a win-win outcome for both the firm and consumers under certain conditions. We also consider several extensions to check the robustness of our findings. This paper was accepted by Jeannette Song, operations management. Funding: Y. Liu was substantially supported by a grant from the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (Project No. PolyU15502420). Y. Liu was also supported by a grant from NSFC [72293564/72293560]. Supplemental Material: The data and online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.03042 .

消费者内价格歧视信用退款退款政策产品退货