Shareholder litigation rights and firm productivity
研究股东诉讼风险降低对企业生产率的影响，发现治理恶化与管理者注意力增加带来混合效应，低接管威胁企业受负面影响，而激励管理层的企业生产率增长更高。
Abstract This paper analyzes the impacts of decreased shareholder litigation risk on firm productivity. Shareholder litigation provides shareholders a mechanism to enforce rights and mitigate agency conflicts. We use a staggered state‐level adoption of universal demand (UD) laws as an exogenous shock that suppressed the number of shareholder derivative lawsuits. We show that the resulting deterioration in corporate governance, coupled with increased managerial attention, had mixed effects on productivity. Adverse effects resulting from lower litigation risk are primarily observed in firms facing low takeover threats. Conversely, firms with incentivised management achieved a higher productivity growth.