Firm Competition and Cooperation with Norm‐Based Preferences for Sustainability
研究了当消费者对可持续性的偏好受社会规范影响时，企业协调引入可持续产品变体的激励，发现竞争程度低时企业会合作引入，竞争激烈时合作反而阻碍引入，为反垄断中的“先动劣势”观点提供了支持与限定。
We analyze firms' incentives to coordinate on the introduction of a sustainable product variant when consumers' preferences for sustainability depend on the perceived social norm, which in turn is shaped by average consumption behavior. We show that such preferences could lead to multiple equilibria. If the level of competition among potential adopters is very low and adoption of the sustainable variant allows them to sufficiently expand their aggregate market share, they will coordinate on introducing the sustainable variant when a lenient legal regime makes this feasible. If competition among them is intense and market expansion under the sustainable variant is very limited, coordination can forestall the adoption of the sustainable variant. Our analysis thus both confirms and qualifies the notion of a sustainability “first‐mover disadvantage” as a justification for an agreement between competitors, which has gained traction in antitrust. We also provide empirical evidence for norm‐based sustainability preferences.