What we pay in the shadows: Labor tax evasion, minimum wage hike and employment
研究最低工资上调如何影响不同税收遵从度的企业就业，发现逃税企业通过将未申报现金转为正式工资来应对，而合规企业则面临负面就业效应。
The interactions between minimum wage policy and tax evasion remain largely unknown. We study the firm-level employment effects of a large and biting minimum wage increase in the context of widespread wage underreporting. We apply machine learning to classify firms as either tax-compliant or tax-evading. We then show that firms engaged in labor tax evasion are insensitive to the minimum wage shock. Our results indicate that these firms use wage underreporting as an adjustment margin, converting part of their formerly undeclared cash payments into official wages. Increasing the minimum wage improves tax enforcement, but comes at the cost of negative employment consequences for compliant firms.