The groupwise-pivotal referral auction: Core-selecting referral strategy-proof mechanism
提出群体关键推荐机制，解决拍卖中买家通过推荐参与时的激励问题，该机制在完全信息下选择核心分配、保证预算平衡，在不完全信息下激励真实推荐和出价，事后收入优于VCG和SPA。
We introduce the groupwise-pivotal referral (GPR) mechanism for auctions where buyers can participate through referrals. Each buyer's type consists of a valuation and referable buyers. Unlike the second-price auction (SPA), the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism provides referral incentives. However, VCG is not budget-feasible. In contrast, under complete information, GPR is core-selecting, implying efficiency and budget feasibility. Under incomplete information, bidders refer truthfully and have no incentive to underbid in GPR. Furthermore, GPR's ex-post revenue outperforms both VCG and SPA, not just in equilibrium but also when bidders do not use weakly dominated strategies.