Designing school choice mechanisms: A structural model and demand estimation
通过结构模型和需求估计，比较了不同学校选择机制的经济效率、稳定性和策略行为，发现保留部分名额通过纯随机抽签分配能显著提高真实偏好报告率。
Abstract Designing the markets that allocate public school seats is a crucial policy consideration. This paper compares the design of school choice mechanisms in terms of economic efficiency, stability, and strategic behavior. We estimate demand for schools using data from a large US public school system with novel indicators of students' levels of strategic sophistication. We find important benefits of reserving a set of seats to be assigned by a pure lottery. In settings that share features in common with the school system we study, our findings suggest that non‐selective criteria such as lotteries induce a large increase in truth‐telling.