Do Audit Committees and Auditors Coordinate Effort? Evidence from Risk Areas, Materiality and Meetings
研究了审计委员会与外部审计师在风险领域、重要性和会议方面的努力协调与信息共享，发现两者风险报告数量正相关，且重要性越低委员会披露的风险越多。
ABSTRACT We provide evidence on effort coordination and information sharing between audit committees and external auditors. We use four effort measures: the risk areas reported by both the auditor and committee, auditor-reported materiality, and committee meetings. We find that the number of risks reported by the auditor (committee) is positively related to the number of risks reported by the committee (auditor) and that lower materiality is associated with more risks that the committee discloses. The evidence also suggests that although risk areas are “sticky,” the committee identifies new risks faster, whereas the auditor focuses on shared risks. Next, our analysis indicates that audit process standardization influences reporting quality in a nonlinear manner. Finally, although audit fees tend to rise with auditor effort, they are unrelated to the committee’s effort. Our findings endorse the service perspective on auditing by emphasizing the collaborative nature of the audit process over individual actors’ self-interests. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M41; M42; G38.