Disclosure of Bank-Specific Information and the Stability of Financial Systems
研究发现披露银行特定信息会重新分配系统性风险，但能否缓解系统性银行挤兑取决于所披露信息的性质；只有披露银行对系统性风险的敞口才能有效缓解挤兑。
Abstract We find that disclosing bank-specific information reallocates systemic risk, but whether it mitigates systemic bank runs depends on the nature of information disclosed. Disclosure reveals banks’ resilience to adverse shocks and shifts systemic risk from weak to strong banks. Yet, only disclosure of banks’ exposure to systemic risk can mitigate systemic bank runs because it shifts systemic risk from more vulnerable banks to those less vulnerable. Disclosure of banks’ idiosyncratic shortfalls of funds does not differentiate such exposure, rendering the resultant reallocation of systemic risk ineffective in mitigating systemic runs.