Forbearance versus Foreclosure in a General Equilibrium Model
研究了在包含企业动态和债务重组的商业周期模型中，贷款宽容在金融危机期间是否损害经济，发现银行监管不力和贷款不透明会加剧道德风险，而激进降息和量化宽松可减少违约和产出收缩。
Abstract In a business cycle model with endogenous firms' dynamics and debt renegotiation, we show that during financial crises loan forbearance does not harm the economy unless banks imperfectly monitor loans, and loan opacity worsens banks' moral hazard problem. Aggressive interest rate reductions and quantitative easing limit defaults and financial crisis‐induced output contractions without hampering the entry of new firm entries. The decline in the natural interest rate, due to slower productivity growth and persistent liquidity shocks, potentially explains the observed long‐term trend in nonperforming loan shares.