Imperfect Private Information in Insurance Markets
研究了保险市场中消费者对自身风险感知不准确时，合同如何内生调整，以及这种误感知对均衡合同、风险池和福利的影响，基于美国健康与退休调查数据发现高风险者低估风险、低风险者高估风险。
Abstract This paper studies imperfectly perceived private information in insurance markets when contracts endogenously respond. Equilibrium contracts, pooling, and welfare depend on the joint distribution of risk and misperception. In the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), I show that misperceptions typically covary with (medical, long-term care, disability, and mortality) risk type: high types underperceive their risk and low types overperceive. I develop a general model and algorithm to estimate the equilibrium contracts, pooling, and welfare impact of misperceptions that is applicable in many settings. I offer suggestive evidence from U.S. annuity markets that contracts are distorted due to misperceptions, with welfare likely increasing.