Disclosing to Informed Traders
研究了经理人向知情投资者自愿披露信息的策略，发现披露概率与市场流动性的关系取决于经理人是否已知知情，且公共信息可能促进更多自愿披露。
ABSTRACT We develop a model in which a firm's manager can voluntarily disclose to privately informed investors. In equilibrium, the manager only discloses sufficiently favorable news. If the manager is known to be informed but disclosure is costly, the probability of disclosure increases with market liquidity and the stock trades at a discount relative to expected cash flows. However, when investors are uncertain about whether the manager is informed, disclosure can decrease with market liquidity and the stock can trade at a premium relative to expected cash flows. Moreover, contrary to common intuition, public information can crowd in more voluntary disclosure.