Global outsourcing and voluntary disclosure
利用国际供应链数据，研究发现全球外包会降低美国企业的自愿性信息披露水平，且当制度差异大或诉讼风险高时影响更显著，但投资者需求可缓解此效应。
Abstract Reliance on global outsourcing has become an economic imperative for many major corporations worldwide, but at the same time, it has brought substantial risks and complexities to these firms. This study employs novel international supply chain data to examine whether global outsourcing of goods or services shapes US corporate disclosure policies. Our main results suggest a negative impact of global outsourcing exposure on voluntary disclosure, and several identification tests further support this baseline evidence. We find that the adverse effect on disclosure is more pronounced when institutional differences are more significant between the United States and foreign suppliers' countries and when US firms face higher litigation risks. However, the effect weakens when investors and stakeholders demand more information. Collectively, our study provides new insights into the economic implications of outsourcing globally from an information disclosure perspective.