Shareholder Activism in Small-Cap Newly Public Firms
研究了一家英国基金在小盘新上市公司中的股东积极主义行为，发现其私下参与成功率很高，能带来8%至10%的累计异常回报，且超额收益主要来自参与而非选股。
We examine a private dataset of engagements by a UK fund in small-cap newly public firms. The fund inherits unwanted holdings from disparate investors and earns fees liquidating its portfolio. It considers activism only when blocks cannot be exited efficiently. Engagements are with firms that have founder chairpersons or CEOs, other blockholders thought to be supportive, and few outside directors. Engagements are conducted behind-the-scenes, without involving other shareholders, are strikingly successful, and result in cumulative abnormal returns of 8% to 10% when objectives are met. The fund outperforms benchmarks, and we estimate that abnormal returns derive mostly from engagements rather than stock picking.