CEOs’ capital gains tax liabilities and accounting conservatism
研究了CEO未实现资本利得的税负如何影响公司会计稳健性，发现税负越高，会计稳健性需求越低，尤其在杠杆高、违约风险大及CEO与股东利益一致时更明显，揭示了税负缓解股东-债权人代理冲突的作用。
Abstract Recent studies show that the tax‐induced lock‐in effect discourages CEOs from unwinding their unrestricted equity and subsequently exacerbates their risk‐aversion. I investigate how CEOs’ unrealized capital gains tax liabilities (tax burdens) influence financial reporting conservatism. I find that the demand for accounting conservatism decreases with CEO tax burdens. Further analyses show that the negative relation between CEO tax burden and conservatism is stronger when the firm has high leverage and high default risk and when the CEO's incentives are more aligned with equity holders. This highlights the shareholder–creditor agency conflicts mitigation role of CEO tax burdens in reducing creditors’ demand for conservatism. I exploit the Federal Taxpayer Reform Act of 1997 and staggered state‐level tax cuts that significantly decreased personal capital gains tax rates as identification strategies.