The Lion’s Share: Evidence from Federal Contracts on the Value of Political Connections
研究了美国国防支出意外增加时，政治关联企业获得的联邦合同金额更大，尤其是游说企业合同高出约三分之一，且该效应在监管薄弱时更明显。
We examine the role of political connections in receiving federal funds during an unexpected surge in government defense spending. While the data do not allow identification of a causal link, the analysis shows that politically connected firms were awarded larger amounts in federal contracts when available funds increased. Defense contracts awarded to firms that lobbied were around onethird higher than contracts awarded to firms that did not lobby. Similar evidence holds for campaign contributions and board connections. The increase in the contract amount is observed primarily for firms with limited ability to efficiently support the Pentagon’s efforts and when contracts received less scrutiny. Between political connections and merit as potential channels to affect government contracting, the results mainly, but not exclusively, support the first channel.