A Supply Chain System Involving the Interaction of Guarantee Finance With Product Quality and After-Sales Service
研究了制造商、第三方物流和零售商组成的供应链中，两种博弈模式（纳什博弈和制造商主导的斯塔克伯格博弈）对担保融资与售后服务最优方案的影响，发现纳什博弈能促进质量、服务和绩效，而制造商主导博弈则起抑制作用。
Our study examines a supply chain system involving a manufacturer, a third-party logistics (3PL), and a retailer. In this system, the capital-constrained retailer could obtain a loan from the bank under the guarantee of the capital-abundant upstream company (i.e., manufacturer or 3PL). Previous research has focused on the manufacturer or the 3PL acting as the guarantor and the manufacturer acting as the after-sales service provider. However, there is no research on the 3PL acting as the after-sales service provider. In the real world, in order to create a one-stop solution, 3PLs also carry out after-sales service business. We conduct an in-depth study of the influence of the two game modes (i.e., Nash game and manufacturer leadership Stackelberg game) between the manufacturer and the 3PL on the optimal scheme choice of guarantee finance and after-sales service. Our findings show that: (1) Only if the conditions of flourishing market are satisfied, Nash equilibrium is consistent with the profit maximization goal of all members of the supply chain. (2) Manufacturer leadership Stackelberg game could enable all members of the supply chain to achieve the consistent goal of maximizing profit. (3) The manufacturer leader Stackelberg game will have an inhibitory effect on quality, after-sales service, and supply chain performance; the Nash game will have a promoting effect on quality, after-sales service, and supply chain performance. Our study provides valuable insights for engineering managers in industrial production to select the combined roles of guarantor and servicer in supply chain systems.