ENDING WASTEFUL YEAR‐END SPENDING: ON OPTIMAL BUDGET RULES IN ORGANIZATIONS
研究组织如何通过最优预算结转和审计规则来减少年末突击花钱，发现允许部分结转、审计大额支出以及策略性减少拨款可有效抑制资金滥用。
Abstract What can organizations do to minimize wasteful year‐end spending? I introduce a two‐period model to derive optimal budget roll‐over and audit rules. A principal tasks an agent with using a budget to fulfill the organization's spending needs, which are private information of the agent. The agent can misuse funds for private benefit. The optimal rules allow the agent to roll‐over a share of the unused funds, but not necessarily the full share, and in most cases to audit only sufficiently large spending. The optimal audit rule can change once fund roll‐over is allowed. Strategically underfunding the agent can be optimal.