Leader Networks and Interjurisdictional Contracting in Land Conversion Quotas
利用中国允许县际土地转换配额交易的政策数据，研究政府官员网络如何降低跨辖区交易成本，发现基于工作经历的领导者网络显著促进交易，而非工作关系则无此效果。
Do network connections between government officials and administrative units facilitate efficient land use contracting across jurisdictions? This article leverages data from a groundbreaking policy in China where a strict quota-bound land use policy was replaced with an alternative, allowing between-county trade in land conversion quotas. We unpack the determinants of the boundary between trading and autarkic jurisdictions and unveil leader-related drivers of transaction costs between jurisdictions in a gravity-style estimation. We catalogue personal and career histories of county-level leaders and present evidence that leader networks derived from employment history are robustly trade-facilitating but nonworkplace links are not.