Does negative news disclosure induce better decision‐making? Evidence from acquisitions
研究负面新闻披露如何影响公司收购决策，发现负面新闻比例越高，公司越少发起收购，但一旦收购，市场反应更好，尤其对低薪酬绩效敏感性和集中行业的公司。
Abstract We examine the effect of negative news disclosures on acquisition decisions of firms. Using textual analysis of company press releases, we find that the percentage of negative news disclosed by a firm reduces its probability of acquisitions. However, for firms that do undertake acquisitions, the percentage of negative news disclosed is positively related to announcement‐period abnormal returns. Consistent with theoretical predictions, this positive relationship is more pronounced for acquirers with low pay‐performance sensitivity and those operating in concentrated industries. Overall, our results suggest that when managerial reputation concerns are high following negative news development, they make more prudent acquisition decisions.