Strategic Foundations of Efficient Rational Expectations
研究了交易者准线性效用且私人信号包含未观测状态信息的经济体，发现当有效分配具有单调性时，包含拍卖在内的市场机制与瓦尔拉斯理性预期均衡结果一致，否则存在差异。
Abstract We study an economy with traders whose payoffs are quasilinear and whose private signals are informative about an unobserved state parameter. The limit economy has infinitely many traders partitioned into a finite set of symmetry classes called types. Market mechanisms in a class that includes auctions yield the same outcome as the Walrasian rational expectations equilibrium if and only if the efficient allocation has a monotonicity property. Examples illustrate cases where they differ. Monotonicity restricts the heterogeneity among traders’ types.