Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market: Structural properties and the Serial Vickrey mechanism
研究了含多种异质物品的指派市场，提出了能处理一般偏好并找到最低价格均衡的序列维克瑞机制，适合研究市场设计和拍卖理论的学者。
We study an assignment market where multiple heterogenous objects are sold to unit demand agents who have general preferences that accommodate income effects and market frictions. The minimum price equilibrium (MPE) is one of the most important equilibrium concepts in such settings. Nevertheless, none of the well-known mechanisms that find the MPE in the quasi-linear settings can identify or even approximate MPEs for general preferences. We establish novel structural properties of MPEs and use them as bases to design a "Serial Vickrey (SV) mechanism." The SV mechanism finds an MPE for general preferences in a finite number of steps and only requires agents to reveal finite-dimensional information regarding their preferences in finitely many times. Besides, the SV mechanism also has nice incentive properties.