Competition and Career Advancement
研究指出，员工的职业晋升不仅取决于工作表现，还受与工作无关的维度（如出勤率）影响，通过父亲陪产假的案例，发现竞争对手的休假行为会改善焦点员工的收入轨迹，而自身休假无直接影响。
Abstract In standard promotion tournaments, contestants are ranked based on their output or productivity. We argue that workers' career progression may also depend on their relative rankings in dimensions a priori unrelated to their job performance, such as visibility or in-person presence. Such implicit tournaments may rationalize a variety of seemingly counterproductive practices in the workplace, including long working hours, low uptake of statutory leave, and presenteeism. We illustrate the significance of implicit tournaments using the case of paternity leave among new fathers, where we exogenously vary a focal worker's ranking within a contest, not via his own leave status but that of his competitors, exploiting a policy reform. We show that the focal worker is put on a better earnings trajectory than otherwise when a larger share of his competitors take leave because of the reform. The focal worker's own absolute leave, however, has no direct effect on his earnings path as long as his own and his competitors' leave statuses are symmetric. With effective coordination, it should thus be possible for all fathers to utilize paternity leave without incurring unwarranted career costs. This has implications for statutory leave policies, flexible work arrangements, and gender equality.