Corporate bond price reversals
实证发现公司债券交易商通过将潜在知情交易转给机构投资者来缓解逆向选择风险，高成交量日后的价格反转程度随信息不对称增加而上升，表明交易商不持仓时债券价格的信息含量更高。
I demonstrate empirically that corporate bond dealers mitigate adverse selection risk by passing potentially informed transactions to institutional investors. I contrast price reversals following days with abnormal trading volume across bonds with different information asymmetry. In informed trading, the part of reversal specific to high-volume days should increase with information asymmetry. In uninformed trading, there is no such effect. Following high-volume days when investors provide liquidity, the reversals are consistent with the former case. When dealers provide liquidity, I observe the latter. The results suggest that the informational content of bond prices is higher when dealers do not take inventory.