Nationalistic bias in collusion prosecution: the case for international antitrust agreements
研究竞争当局在跨国企业合谋起诉中的激励，发现本国可能为保护海外利润而延迟起诉，但这对全球福利不利，国际反垄断协议可改善两国福利。
Abstract We study the incentives of competition authorities to prosecute collusive practices of domestic and foreign firms in a multimarket contact model between two firms operating in two countries. In equilibrium, the country of origin of the firms might prefer to delay prosecution to protect profits in foreign markets. This strategic delay is valuable because prosecution in the country of origin of the firms activates an information spillover that triggers prosecution in the foreign country. Prosecution delays, however, are suboptimal under global welfare. With multiple industries, both countries can be better off under integration or signing an international antitrust agreement.