Fight or flight? Explaining the role of the European Parliament in the establishment of the Recovery and Resilience Facility
研究了新冠危机期间欧洲议会为何未能最大化其在恢复与韧性基金中的预算权力，发现危机紧迫性和自身修辞策略反而削弱了其谈判地位。
During the COVID-19 crisis, the European Parliament (EP) had an opportunity to shape Europe’s economic recovery and strengthen its institutional prerogatives through the establishment of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF). Despite influencing policies and securing soft account-holding powers, the EP failed to assert itself as a budgetary authority in the RRF implementation process. Budgetary authority is a fundamental element in democratic governance as it allows elected representatives to supervise the allocation of public funds and enforce accountability for government spending choices. This article explains the EP’s failure to maximise its budgetary powers and argues that the urgency of the crisis and the strategic use of norm-based arguments inadvertently undermined its bargaining position. The EP’s entrapment in its own rhetorical action is proposed as the main explanation for this outcome. The EP had long emphasised key aspects of the RRF, such as financing through common European debt issuance. As even the most hesitant member states eventually agreed on many of these issues, the EP could not obstruct or delay negotiations without being publicly exposed for inconsistencies between its past rhetoric and present actions. Consequently, it risked being shamed for prioritising its institutional ego over the common European interest.