Debt Crises, Fast and Slow
构建动态模型研究经济在中等债务水平易受信念驱动的慢速债务危机影响，而在低和高债务水平则面临展期危机；发现反周期赤字在应对慢速危机时优于减债政策，但若政府担忧低债务时失去市场准入，减债福利更优。
Abstract We build a dynamic model where the economy is vulnerable to belief-driven slow-moving debt crises at intermediate debt levels, and rollover crises at both low and high debt levels. Vis-à-vis the threat of slow-moving crises, countercyclical deficits generally welfare-dominate debt reduction policies. In a recession, optimizing governments only deleverage if debt is close to the threshold below which belief-driven slow-moving crises can no longer occur. The welfare benefits from deleveraging instead dominate if governments are concerned with losing market access even at low debt levels. Long bond maturities may fully eliminate belief-driven rollover crises but not slow-moving ones.