Equity‐efficiency tradeoffs in international bargaining
研究不对称国家间国际协议谈判议程扩大对福利的影响，发现增加谈判灵活性虽提升效率，却可能损害弱势国家的公平，降低不对称性也可能使弱势国家更糟。
Abstract This paper analyzes the welfare impact of expanding the negotiation agenda of an international agreement between asymmetric countries (e.g., including specific negotiations over environmental regulations or labor standards in a conventional trade agreement) and demonstrates why such proposed expansions are contentious. A main result is that agenda expansions that provide more bargaining flexibility will increase the efficiency of the agreement but can result in a less equitable agreement that hurts the country that is at a bargaining disadvantage. Similarly, we demonstrate that decreases in bargaining game asymmetry can also make the disadvantaged country worse‐off even as it increases global welfare.