Dynamic preferential trade agreement formation and the role of political economy
通过动态模型研究政治偏见如何影响优惠贸易协定的形成，发现出口和进口竞争部门的政治偏向会显著影响协定扩展，并比较了自由贸易协定与关税同盟在灵活性及协调性上的不同作用。
Abstract Using a dynamic preferential trade agreement (PTA) formation model, we show that political biases in exporting and import‐competing sectors substantially impact the extent of PTA formation. While both exclusion and free riding incentives constrain the expansion to global free trade in a free trade agreement (FTA) game, only the former incentive arises in a customs union (CU) game. When we endogenize the choice between FTAs and CUs, the tension between the flexibility benefit of FTAs and the coordination benefit of CUs reveals that FTAs always serve as PTA building blocks while CUs may serve as PTA building or stumbling blocks.