The Effect of Takeover Protection in Quiet Life and Bonding Firms
研究发现收购保护对股东的影响因企业类型而异：在易出现安逸生活代理问题的企业中，收购保护降低内部闲置现金的市场价值；而在需绑定主要交易伙伴的企业中，现金价值反而上升。
Abstract Antitakeover measures are controversial because the evidence of their net effect on shareholders is mixed. We propose that, for many firms, the potential bonding benefits outweigh the agency costs of the quiet life, explaining the mixed results. We study business combination and poison pill laws as exogenous shocks to takeover vulnerability and use shareholder valuation of internal slack as an indicator of the net effect of takeover protection. Firms susceptible to quiet life agency problems exhibit a decrease in the market-assessed value of internal slack. Conversely, cash appreciates at companies where takeover protection bonds commitments with major counterparties.