Positive and Negative Sorting in Team Contests*
研究了管理者如何将四名不同生产力的工人分成两队进行竞赛，比较了同质分组（正向）和异质分组（反向）的最优选择，并扩展了奖金设置、资源分配和竞争强度等决策。
This paper investigates the formation of teams in a contest. A manager sorts four workers—who differ in their productivity—into two teams. Workers on each team join forces to produce team output, and one team wins a prize; for example, a bonus package. Two sorting patterns are possible: Positive sorting requires that each team consist of players of same caliber and negative sorting the opposite. We characterize the optimum. We further extend the model to allow the manager to set a prize schedule for the workers on each team upon a win, allocate productive resources between teams, and pick the level of competition of the contest.